Post-Quantum Defenses

Client Alert

Mar 2

The intersection of emerging technologies and intellectual property law has never been more critical. As quantum computing advances from theoretical research to practical application, it presents both unprecedented challenges and opportunities for IP practitioners and their clients. This article examines how post-quantum cryptographic developments implicate core IP concerns, including patent strategy, trade secret protection, and the safeguarding of confidential information, and outlines practical considerations for organizations navigating this rapidly evolving landscape.

Most people hear “quantum computing” and think only about a future disaster where powerful quantum machines break today’s encryption and drain Bitcoin wallets or expose bank accounts. But the risk is broader and more immediate. Any organization that relies on public‑key cryptography for logins, virtual private networks, code‑signing, payments, cloud access, or document signatures is exposed over time, not just cryptocurrency holders.[1] The same quantum advances that threaten today’s cryptography, however, can be used to strengthen digital trust for everyone by pushing businesses toward new, “post‑quantum” defenses.[2]

Post‑quantum cryptography, often abbreviated as PQC, refers to a new generation of cryptographic algorithms that are designed to remain secure even when large‑scale quantum computers exist.[3] The United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has run a multi‑year global competition to select and standardize these algorithms so that governments, banks, cloud providers, and ordinary companies can move away from vulnerable schemes such as the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) system and elliptic‑curve cryptography, which are directly threatened by quantum algorithms like Shor’s algorithm.[4] And in August 2024, NIST released its first core standards in the form of Federal Information Processing Standards: ML‑KEM, a “module‑lattice‑based key‑encapsulation mechanism” derived from the CRYSTALS‑Kyber family, for establishing shared keys, and ML‑DSA, a “module‑lattice‑based digital signature algorithm” derived from the CRYSTALS‑Dilithium family, along with a hash‑based backup called SLH‑DSA, which includes schemes like SPHINCS Plus.[5]

NIST’s guidance to all organizations is simple but urgent. Identify where you use quantum‑vulnerable algorithms today, and start planning to replace them with post‑quantum schemes such as ML‑KEM and ML‑DSA.[6] This applies to every business that uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) for web traffic, relies on digital signatures to authenticate software and documents, uses virtual private networks for remote workers, or depends on encrypted databases and backups to protect customer data, trade secrets, research and development files, or merger and acquisition plans.[7] A key challenge is the “harvest now, decrypt later” model, sometimes shortened to HNDL or described as “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks: adversaries steal encrypted data today and store it until a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, often abbreviated as a CRQC, is available to decrypt it.[8] For data with a long life, such as core intellectual property, health records, proprietary artificial intelligence models, or long‑term contracts, the vulnerability already exists at the moment of theft, not at some future quantum breakthrough date.[9]

Against this backdrop, quantum is not only a cyber‑risk for banks and crypto projects. It is a strategic issue for every sector that depends on digital trust.[10] Financial networks such as the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, known as SWIFT, and other high‑value payment systems must plan multi‑phase migrations to post‑quantum cryptography while still interconnecting with partners who may adopt at different speeds.[11] Large enterprises running critical workloads on older Common Business‑Oriented Language (COBOL) systems and other legacy platforms face similar hurdles, because post‑quantum algorithms typically use larger keys and signatures, require more computation, and can break hard‑coded assumptions in old software.[12] At the same time, more agile ecosystems, including modern blockchains and cloud‑native platforms, can integrate NIST‑approved post‑quantum schemes into their protocols and services sooner, potentially offering customers a visibly “quantum‑ready” alternative.[13]

For businesses, this shift has a powerful intellectual property dimension. The post‑quantum algorithms selected by NIST, including ML‑KEM and ML‑DSA, grew out of research programs such as the CRYSTALS family and are connected to patent portfolios held by technology companies and research organizations that contributed to or optimized these schemes.[14] There is now a growing thicket of patents and patent applications that cover not only the raw mathematics, but also efficient hardware implementations, side‑channel protections, key‑management frameworks, and “crypto‑agility” architectures that let systems swap cryptographic algorithms without breaking.[15] Companies that implement post‑quantum cryptography in their products, from secure messaging and cloud platforms to industrial systems and blockchain infrastructure, need to map this intellectual property landscape early to avoid unintentional infringement and to identify where they can build defensible patent positions of their own.

The same is true for other forms of intellectual property beyond patents. Trade secrets, such as proprietary algorithms, customer lists, or chemical formulas, are uniquely exposed to “harvest now, decrypt later” threats because their value often extends for decades.[16] Copyrighted materials and confidential datasets used for training artificial intelligence models are also at risk if their confidentiality depends on encryption that will not withstand a future cryptographically relevant quantum computer.[17] Boards and executives therefore need to treat post‑quantum migration as part of their core intellectual property strategy. Therefore, they should classify which data would be catastrophic to expose in ten or twenty years, prioritize that data for post‑quantum protection, and align patent and licensing strategy with the cryptographic tools they choose.[18]

In short, while quantum computing poses significant challenges to current cryptographic systems, characterizing it as an outright threat that will “kill crypto” oversimplifies a more nuanced reality. The cryptocurrency and broader technology industries are actively developing quantum-resistant solutions, and the timeline for cryptographically relevant quantum computers remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that quantum computing forces every business that relies on digital trust, intellectual property, and long‑lived data to confront both a security transition and an intellectual property realignment.[19] Organizations that move early to understand NIST’s post‑quantum standards, inventory their cryptographic use, modernize legacy systems, and deliberately shape their patent and trade‑secret strategies around post‑quantum tools will not just avoid a future crisis. They will be positioned as quantum‑ready partners of choice in a world where trust, security, and intellectual property are all being repriced.

Our firm, Pierson Ferdinand LLP, is actively monitoring these technological and legal developments at the intersection of quantum computing, cybersecurity, and intellectual property. We are prepared to advise clients on patent landscape assessments related to post-quantum cryptography, trade secret protection strategies for long-lived confidential information, compliance with evolving federal standards and guidance, and the integration of quantum-readiness into broader IP portfolio management. Please contact Partner Benjamin I. Dach (ben.dach@pierferd.com) or your regular PierFerd contact to discuss how these developments may affect your organization and how we can assist in positioning your business for the post-quantum future.

This publication and/or any linked publications herein do not constitute legal, accounting, or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts or matters and, accordingly, the author(s) and PierFerd assume no liability whatsoever in connection with its use. Pursuant to applicable rules of professional conduct, this publication may constitute Attorney Advertising. © 2026 Pierson Ferdinand LLP.

[1] https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography; https://www.techjournal.uk/p/harvest-now-decrypt-later-quantum.

[2] https://www.hoschmorris.com/privacy-plus-news/post-quantum-cryptography.

[3] https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography.

[4] https://research.ibm.com/blog/nist-pqc-standards.

[5] https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards; https://www.keyfactor.com/blog/nist-standards-are-officially-finalized-now-what/; https://www.ru.nl/en/research/research-news/nist-chooses-kyber-dilithium-and-sphincs-as-standards-for-post-quantumcryptography.

[6] https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography.

[7] https://www.hoschmorris.com/privacy-plus-news/post-quantum-cryptography; https://technologyquotient.freshfields.com/post/102lx4l/quantum-disentangled-1-harvest-now-decrypt-later-the-quantum-threat-is-a.

[8] https://www.techjournal.uk/p/harvest-now-decrypt-later-quantum; https://technologyquotient.freshfields.com/post/102lx4l/quantum-disentangled-1-harvest-now-decrypt-later-the-quantum-threat-is-a.

[9] https://technologyquotient.freshfields.com/post/102lx4l/quantum-disentangled-1-harvest-now-decrypt-later-the-quantum-threat-is-a.

[10] https://www.hoschmorris.com/privacy-plus-news/post-quantum-cryptography; https://www.appsecengineer.com/blog/quantum-safe-cryptography-standards-forging-an-unbreakable-digital-fortress.

[11] https://wqs.events/swift-migration-to-post-quantum-cryptography-a-comprehensive-implementation-guide; https://www.qurisk.fr/s/Towards_a_Holistic_Risk_Framework_For_PQC_Migration_in_Legacy_Systems.pdf.

[12]https://www.qurisk.fr/s/Towards_a_Holistic_Risk_Framework_For_PQC_Migration_in_Legacy_Systems.pdf.